Crypto custody software: what it includes, who holds the keys, and what it costs
What crypto custody software includes, how HSM, MPC and multisig compare, how withdrawal approvals work, and what self-hosted and custodial routes cost.
BitPolaris Engineering
English original
Crypto custody software is the system a business runs to generate and store private keys, decide who may move funds, sign and broadcast transactions on each blockchain, and prove afterwards that its ledger matches the chain. It is a different purchase from a custodian. With self-hosted custody software, the keys and the operational duty sit with you; with a custodian or a custody-as-a-service platform, another firm holds all or part of the key material and charges for it, usually as basis points on assets or a platform fee.
Below: what digital asset custody software should include, the key-management options, how withdrawal approvals should work and what each route costs, with third-party prices from the vendors’ own pages (read 7 November 2026) and ours from our pricing page. Our custody software has run in production at the reference exchange since 2024; we use it as the worked example and say where it does not fit.
What does crypto custody software include?
Nine parts, whether you build, license or rent them:
| Part | What it does | What to ask |
|---|---|---|
| Key generation and storage | Creates keys in a recorded ceremony; stores them in a keystore, an HSM, MPC shares or multisig signers | Where does each key or share live, and who was present when it was made? |
| Wallet tiers | Hot, warm and cold wallets plus fee and deposit addresses, with balance targets and sweeps | Can each tier have its own ceiling, approvals and delay? |
| Policy engine | Decides which transfers need approval, by whom and when | Can one administrator change the policy alone? |
| Approvals | M-of-N sign-off by named officers with a second factor | What does the approver see before signing? |
| Chain integration | Scans blocks, credits deposits, builds and broadcasts withdrawals, tracks confirmations | Which chains and tokens run in production today? |
| Address controls | Whitelists, delays on new addresses, network checks | Is a TRC-20 address flagged on an ERC-20 withdrawal? |
| Reconciliation | Compares the ledger with on-chain balances continuously | What happens when a check cannot complete? |
| Audit trail | Records every sign-in, approval, policy change and node action | Can auditors export it without a vendor engineer? |
| Recovery | Backups, a standby site, procedures for a lost key, approver or vendor | When was recovery last rehearsed? |
Reconciliation and recovery are the parts most easily skipped in a demo, yet a licence review asks about both: can the system tell you that hot-wallet balances have drifted from the ledger, and has it ever been rebuilt from backup?
Who holds the keys?
The answer sets your licence position, your liability and how you leave. Three models, often combined:
| Self-hosted custody software | Custody-as-a-service (MPC platform) | Custodian | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who holds key material | You, on your servers or HSMs | Shared: you hold some shares, the vendor’s infrastructure others, depending on the setup | The custodian |
| Who enforces the approval policy | Your software, configured by your officers | The platform’s policy engine | The custodian, on your instructions |
| What you operate | Servers, nodes, keystores, approvals, recovery | Your ledger, integrations and share devices | Your ledger and the integration |
| Cost shape | Licence or build, plus hosting, hardware and staff | Subscription and volume fees | Basis points on assets, transfer fees, minimums |
| How you leave | You keep the system and the keys | Needs a tested key export | Withdraw the assets |
It is also a regulatory question. MiCA treats custody and administration of crypto-assets on behalf of clients as an authorised service, and Article 75 requires a custody policy, a register of positions per client, a statement of positions at least every three months, segregation of client crypto-assets from the provider’s own, and liability for losses attributable to the provider, capped at market value. Other regimes ask similar questions. This is a technical reading of the rules, not legal advice; counsel should confirm which model your licence allows.
Hot, warm and cold: the custody architecture
Funds are split by how fast they must move and what a compromise would cost.
- Hot wallets pay withdrawals automatically, within a target balance and a ceiling per asset. Above the ceiling, funds sweep to warm or cold. An empty hot wallet is one of the most common reasons crypto withdrawals get stuck.
- Warm wallets refill hot wallets after an operator approves, so a routine refill does not need the cold quorum.
- Cold wallets hold most reserves, with keys offline on air-gapped machines or offline HSMs, and move only with the full quorum and a time lock. An HSM on the network is not cold by itself.
- Fee wallets hold native coins to pay gas for token collection and withdrawals, apart from customer funds.
- Deposit addresses are per customer and are collected to hot above a threshold.
How much sits in each tier is a policy decision driven by withdrawal volume, risk appetite and, in some jurisdictions, cold-storage rules; write it down per asset. Market-maker float and treasury balances belong in their own accounts, never mixed with customer custody.
Key management: MPC vs HSM vs multisig
Four mechanisms protect the signing key, and most production systems combine two of them.
| Software keystore | HSM | MPC / threshold signatures | On-chain multisig | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Where the key lives | Encrypted keystore or secrets manager, apart from the application | Inside tamper-resistant hardware; signing happens in the device | Split into shares; with distributed key generation the full key never exists | Several full keys, one per signer |
| Where M-of-N is enforced | Your policy engine, before signing | Your policy engine, or governance rules inside the HSM on some products | The signing protocol, plus the platform’s policy engine | The blockchain |
| Chain coverage | Any chain the software integrates | Chains whose signature curve the HSM supports | Chains whose signature algorithm the platform supports | A different mechanism on each chain |
| Main cost | Engineering discipline | Hardware or cloud HSM fees, ceremonies | Vendor fees or scarce in-house expertise | Higher network fees, per-chain engineering |
| Main risk | Host compromise | A policy bypass before the request reaches the HSM | Implementation flaws; shares concentrated in one place | Signers approving a tampered transaction |
| Recovery | Encrypted backups in several places | HSM backup or cloning under ceremony | Resharing, backup shares, a key export that works without the vendor | Remaining quorum replaces a signer; on Bitcoin, funds move to a new address |
Two points matter more than the table. First, a quorum sets how many people an attacker must fool, not whether the right transaction is signed. The FBI attributed the theft of about $1.5 billion from Bybit on 21 February 2025 to North Korea; NCC Group concluded that the multisig signers most likely saw the intended transfer in the Safe web interface while their hardware wallets showed unreadable data for a tampered transaction, which they signed. Approvers need to see the decoded destination, amount and operation type. Second, no hardware or cryptography replaces an approval policy that one administrator cannot bypass. Our MPC vs multisig guide covers chain-by-chain mechanics, incidents and recovery.
Withdrawal policy and approvals
A withdrawal policy is the set of rules checked before anything is signed:
- Amount bands with M-of-N quorums. Small withdrawals pass automatically within limits; larger ones need one, two or three named officers; the largest add a delay.
- Whitelists and delays. New addresses wait a fixed period before first use, so a compromised account cannot drain funds in minutes. Daily caps apply per asset and per customer tier.
- Separation of duties. Nobody who can create a transfer can approve it, and approvers use separate devices.
- Time locks on cold moves, and a break-glass procedure that leaves a record and alerts every officer.
- Policy changes under the same control. A policy one administrator can relax silently is not a control; version and log every change.
- Automation behind explicit switches. Sweeps and refills run only when several independent flags allow it, under a daily value cap.
The defaults in our custody software, as an example:
| Band | Approval |
|---|---|
| Below a floor | 1 of 3 officers |
| Middle band | 2 of 3 officers |
| Above a threshold | 3 of 5 officers, plus a delay |
| Cold wallet moves | Full quorum, plus a time lock |
| New withdrawal address | 24-hour delay, on by default |
Every approval is a TOTP event by a named officer, and each policy version records who changed what and when.
Audit trail, reconciliation and proof of reserves
Auditors and regulators ask three things of custody: who did what, whether the books match the chain, and whether client assets are kept apart from the company’s. So the software should keep an exportable log of every sign-in, approval, policy change and node action, and reconcile the ledger against on-chain balances continuously, reporting a check that cannot complete as unknown rather than fine.
Proof of reserves builds on the same data: customer balances in a Merkle sum tree, on-chain balances at a recorded block and signed wallet ownership. Our guide to implementing proof of reserves explains the parts and what it cannot prove.
Chain coverage
For each chain, ask whether it runs in production today, which token standards work (ERC-20, BEP-20, TRC-20, SPL), how confirmation depth is set per asset, whether the system reads from RPC providers, its own full nodes or both, and what adding a chain costs. Chains are where custody projects slow down: across the nine chains our software supports, native multisig works through five different mechanisms, MPC depends on the platform supporting each signature algorithm, and TRON energy, Ethereum nonces and XRP destination tags each need their own handling. RPC failover matters too: a bridge that falls behind the chain credits deposits late and hides reserve gaps.
Buy, build or use a custodian
| Build in-house | License self-hosted software | Custody-as-a-service platform | Custodian | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What you wait for | Engineering: 9–12 months (our assumption) | Installation, infrastructure, key ceremony | Integration and onboarding | Onboarding and due diligence |
| Upfront | Engineering team | One-time licence | Subscription from the start | Varies; Gemini waives setup |
| Running cost | Team, hosting, audits | Updates and support, hosting, hardware, staff | Subscription plus volume fees | Basis points on assets, transfer fees |
| Keys | Yours | Yours | Shared, depending on setup | The custodian’s |
| Grows with your assets | No | No | Partly, with volume | Yes |
Published facts from vendors in each group, read on 7 November 2026:
- Custodians. Gemini Custody publishes “0.4% or $30 per month per asset, whichever is higher”, with the setup fee waived and network fees passed through at withdrawal. BitGo’s billing methodology describes custody fees as basis points on the average USD balance of assets under custody over the month, with a monthly minimum where applicable; rates are set in each client’s agreement and not published. SIX SIS AG (SIX Group) lists crypto custody at 7 to 20 basis points calculated on monthly average holdings and transfers at CHF 15 to 100, depending on client segment and assets (list in force from 4 May 2026; the custody line does not state the billing period). Copper describes MPC custody in which “no complete private key is ever created” and publishes no price.
- Platforms. Fireblocks lists Essentials at “$999 per month” for “up to 6 months”, with $1,000,000 of quarterly outbound volume and a 0.20% overage, and custom Pro, Enterprise and Enterprise+ plans “starting at $36,000 per year”.
- Licensed software. Ripple Custody offers “on-premise, cloud SaaS, or hybrid” deployment, with HSM-based institutional custody and MPC-TSS wallets. Taurus lists on-premise, managed and hybrid deployment for Taurus-PROTECT, with HSM and MPC signing. Ledger announced Enterprise HSM On-Premise on 13 July 2026: the signer HSM and master seed sit in the client’s data centre, while governance runs on HSMs that Ledger operates and, it says, cannot access. None of the three publishes a price.
Building suits a group with custody engineers and a long horizon. Our planning assumption, not a market statistic: three to four engineers for nine to twelve months to reach nine chains with approvals, reconciliation and rehearsed recovery. At an assumed loaded cost of €8,000 to €10,000 per engineer-month, that is roughly €220,000 to €480,000 before any external security review.
What does crypto custody software cost?
Custodians and platforms charge in proportion to assets or volume; self-hosted custody is a fixed licence plus running costs. BitPolaris prices, in EUR excluding VAT:
| Item | Price |
|---|---|
| Custody, self-hosted licence | €15,400 one-time, or €14,000 with Exchange |
| Updates and support | 20% of the licence a year (€3,080 on €15,400) |
| Custody, source-code licence | €37,800, or €33,600 with Exchange; optional update stream at 15% a year |
| HSM integration (Thales Luna or YubiHSM 2) | €5,250 one-time |
| Standby site | €4,200 one-time |
| Full node | €1,250 per chain, hosting excluded |
| Extra chain beyond the nine | €1,750 per chain |
| Custom token integration | €630 per token |
Lines we do not charge: servers (the configurator shows an indicative €1,100 to €1,800 a month for custody production and staging, paid to your provider); HSM hardware (a YubiHSM 2 lists at €773.50 including VAT on Yubico’s store; as a managed cloud price point, AWS CloudHSM lists $1.92 an hour per HSM (hsm2m) in Frankfurt, and AWS recommends at least three HSMs across availability zones for durability of newly generated keys, about $50,000 a year at list price); network fees; external penetration tests; and the officers and operations engineer who run the system.
A worked comparison, with the assumptions stated. At $10 million of average custody balances, Gemini’s published 0.40% comes to $40,000 a year, and a negotiated 10 basis points (an assumed rate) to $10,000. Self-hosting with us costs €24,850 one-time for the licence with HSM integration and a standby site, then €3,080 a year for updates and support plus roughly €13,200 to €21,600 a year of indicative hosting, before hardware and staff. In this example the custodian is cheaper in cash. At $100 million, the same two rates come to $400,000 and $100,000 a year, while the self-hosted cost barely moves.
Cost decides less often than control. Operators self-host when their licence requires them to hold the keys, when data must stay in a given country, or when they want to be able to change vendors without moving assets.
Where BitPolaris Custody fits
BitPolaris Custody is software you run on your own servers or cloud account; it is not offered on our white-label cloud. We do not hold customer keys or client assets, and buying the software does not give anyone a licence. From the Custody product page:
- Bridges for nine chains (Bitcoin, Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain, Avalanche C-Chain, TRON, Solana, XRP Ledger, Dogecoin, Litecoin) with RPC pools and failover, optional full nodes, and ERC-20, BEP-20, TRC-20 and SPL tokens with contract verification before listing.
- Hot, warm, cold, fee and deposit tiers, and the policy engine and defaults described above.
- Keystores apart from the applications, HashiCorp Vault, and HSM integration on request.
- A reserve monitor that compares the ledger with the chain around the clock, a stuck-money screen and signed proof-of-reserves exports.
- A custody panel that cannot move funds, with mandatory TOTP verified against Vault and an exportable audit log.
To be precise about the model: the M-of-N quorum is an approval policy in the application, checked before the system signs with the wallet’s key from its keystore or HSM. It is not MPC and not on-chain multisig. If you need the chain to enforce the quorum, want no complete key to exist anywhere, or would rather not run servers and key ceremonies, an MPC platform, on-chain multisig or a custodian may suit you better, alone or alongside a system like ours.
Crypto custody software FAQ
What is the difference between custody software and a custodian?
Custody software is a system you run: it protects keys, applies approval rules, signs transactions and reconciles balances. A custodian is a firm that holds the keys to client assets under its own licence and does that work for you, usually for fees that grow with your assets. With software, the keys and the operational responsibility are yours.
Is MPC better than an HSM for crypto custody?
Neither wins in every case. An HSM keeps a complete key inside tamper-resistant hardware; MPC splits the key into shares so it never exists in one place, which suits hot wallets across many chains. Both depend on an approval policy nobody can bypass and on approvers who see what they sign. Many systems combine them, for example MPC or a keystore for hot wallets and HSM-backed or multisig cold storage.
How much does crypto custody software cost?
Custodians and platforms charge recurring fees; Gemini Custody, for example, publishes 0.40% a year or $30 per asset per month, whichever is higher (read 7 November 2026). Self-hosted software is a one-time licence plus hosting, hardware and staff; BitPolaris Custody starts at €15,400 one-time plus 20% a year for updates and support.
Do I need a licence to run self-hosted custody software?
It depends on whose assets the keys control. If you hold client crypto-assets or the means of access to them, many regimes treat that as a regulated service; MiCA does for custody and administration on behalf of clients. The software provides controls and evidence; the licence, the policies and the people are yours. Counsel should confirm the position in your jurisdiction.
Can custody software produce proof of reserves?
It holds most of the data: wallet addresses, on-chain balances and the ledger. Proof of reserves adds a Merkle sum tree of customer balances, signed ownership messages and a snapshot at a recorded block. Our custody software exports signed proof-of-reserves data; the proof-of-reserves guide covers the rest.
BitPolaris Custody runs on your servers: hot, warm and cold tiers, M-of-N approvals by named officers, whitelists with delays and a reserve monitor that checks the ledger against nine chains around the clock. Prices are public.
Sources
All read on 7 November 2026.
- Gemini, Gemini Custody fee schedule
- BitGo, Billing methodology
- SIX SIS AG, List of charges in connection with crypto currencies, 27 April 2026 (PDF)
- Fireblocks, Pricing
- Copper, About Copper
- Ripple, Ripple Custody
- Taurus, Taurus-PROTECT
- Ledger Enterprise, HSM On-Premise, 13 July 2026
- Yubico, YubiHSM 2
- AWS, CloudHSM pricing and price list file (published 11 September 2026); CloudHSM cluster management best practices
- FBI, North Korea responsible for $1.5 billion Bybit hack, 26 February 2025
- NCC Group, In-depth technical analysis of the Bybit hack, 10 March 2025
- ESMA, MiCA Article 75, providing custody and administration of crypto-assets on behalf of clients
Product names are trademarks of their owners. Descriptions of third-party products come from their public pages and imply no affiliation.