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guide13 Kasım 2026 · 9 min read

Crypto exchange security checklist: keys, approvals, access, monitoring, testing and incident response

A crypto exchange security checklist for operators: keys, withdrawal approvals, staff access, APIs, infrastructure, vendors, monitoring, pen tests, incidents.

BitPolaris Engineering

English original

A crypto exchange security checklist has ten areas: keys and wallets, withdrawal policy and signing, staff access, customer accounts, the application and its APIs, infrastructure, suppliers, monitoring and reconciliation, testing, and incident response. For each one, the useful question is not “do we have it?” but “what record proves it works?”, because that record is what an auditor, a bank’s due-diligence team or a regulator will ask for.

This checklist is written for founders, CTOs and compliance heads of exchanges and brokers, and for anyone comparing exchange software vendors. It maps each area to the controls, the evidence to keep and, where one applies, the clause of the CryptoCurrency Security Standard (CCSS v9.0) or of a regulation. Our examples come from the custody and operations software we run in production at the reference exchange, and we say where our software stops and your team’s work begins.

Why the checklist starts with signing, not passwords

Two of the largest recent exchange losses did not break any cryptography. They went through the workflow around the keys:

  • Bybit, 21 February 2025. The FBI attributed the theft of about $1.5 billion to North Korea’s TraderTraitor activity. NCC Group concluded that the multisig signers most likely saw the intended transfer in the wallet’s web interface while their hardware wallets showed data they could not read, and signed a tampered transaction.
  • DMM Bitcoin, May 2024. The FBI, the US Defense Cyber Crime Center and Japan’s National Police Agency said on 23 December 2024 that TraderTraitor stole 4,502.9 BTC, then worth $308 million, after compromising an employee of Ginco, DMM’s wallet software supplier, and manipulating a legitimate transaction request.

Both cases share a pattern: a quorum of real people approved a transaction they did not fully see, and the entry point was a supplier or a person, not the exchange’s own key storage. MPC vs multisig for crypto exchanges covers these and other incidents in detail. The practical lesson for the checklist is that keys, approvals, staff access and suppliers deserve as much attention as the trading engine.

The checklist at a glance

Area Control Evidence to keep Reference
1. Keys and wallets Keys generated in a recorded ceremony; hot, warm and cold tiers with ceilings; keys stored apart from applications Signed ceremony record; tier ceilings per asset; backup locations CCSS 1.01–1.06
2. Withdrawal policy and signing M-of-N by amount band, address whitelists with delays, daily caps; no single admin can change the policy Versioned policy with change log; approval records per withdrawal CCSS 1.05
3. Staff access MFA for all staff, phishing-resistant for privileged roles; least privilege; no standing vendor access Role matrix; access-review records; vendor session log DORA Art. 9(4)
4. Customer accounts 2FA, holds after credential resets, new-address delays, scoped API keys Account-security settings; hold and alert logs —
5. Application and APIs Secure development standard, rate limits, WAF and DDoS protection, signed webhooks Standard followed; test results; edge configuration OWASP ASVS
6. Infrastructure Signers on a private network; secrets in a vault; encrypted off-site backups; rehearsed restore Network diagram; restore-drill record with timings DORA Art. 12
7. Suppliers Register of ICT suppliers, including wallet, KYC, RPC and software vendors; releases built from version control Supplier register; contracts with audit rights; build records DORA Art. 28
8. Monitoring and reconciliation Ledger vs chain reconciliation; alerting on approvals, policy changes and balance drift; tamper-evident logs Reconciliation history; alert runbooks; exported audit log CCSS 2.02
9. Testing Yearly penetration test of admin, custody and APIs; vulnerability scans; remediation tracking Reports; remediation tracker with dates CCSS 2.01; DORA Art. 24–25
10. Incident response Key-compromise plan; withdrawal pause; reporting clock; drills Plan; drill records; incident register CCSS 2.04; DORA Art. 17–19

CCSS is published by the CryptoCurrency Certification Consortium and groups its aspects into cryptographic asset management (1.01 key material generation to 1.06 data sanitization documentation) and operations (2.01 security tests and audits, 2.02 log and monitor, 2.03 governance and risk, 2.04 key compromise documentation), each at Level I, II or III. The Cloud Security Alliance also publishes crypto-asset exchange security guidelines. Neither is a licence requirement in itself, but both give auditors a shared vocabulary.

1–2. Keys, wallets and the signing path

  • Generate keys in a ceremony with a record. Who was present, which hardware, where each backup went, signed by each person. Repeatable without the vendor.
  • Keep the hot wallet small. A target balance and a ceiling per asset, with sweeps above the ceiling to warm or cold storage. The hot wallet is the amount you can lose in a day.
  • Store keys apart from the applications. The service that takes customer requests should not be able to read key material; ours keeps keystores apart from the applications and secrets in HashiCorp Vault, with HSM integration on request.
  • Set withdrawal policy by amount band. For example 1-of-3 officers below a floor, 2-of-3 in the middle and 3-of-5 with a delay above it; cold moves need the full quorum and a time lock. New withdrawal addresses wait; ours waits 24 hours by default.
  • Make policy changes harder than withdrawals. Version every change, record who made it, and require more than one person to approve it.
  • Show the approver what they sign. Decoded destination, amount, asset and operation type, on the device used to approve. If the signing device shows unreadable data, the approver is signing blind.

Crypto custody software explains wallet tiers and approval policies at length.

3–4. Staff access and customer accounts

Staff. Every account, including engineers and support, has MFA, and each role starts with no access and adds only what it needs. CISA’s guidance of October 2022 treats FIDO/WebAuthn and PKI-based authentication as phishing-resistant and app-based one-time codes as not. Our custody approvals are TOTP events checked against Vault; that is strong against password theft but not against a convincing phishing page, so we recommend phishing-resistant MFA on the identity provider and on admin workstations for anyone who can approve, change policy or reach production. Review access at a fixed interval and record the review. Vendor engineers get time-limited credentials you issue and revoke; on our self-hosted model we keep no standing access.

Customers. 2FA on login and withdrawal, a hold on withdrawals after a password or 2FA reset (our wallet holds for 24 hours), a delay on new withdrawal addresses, email on every security change, and API keys with scopes and an IP allowlist. Explain holds in the interface; a silent hold becomes a support ticket.

5–7. Application, infrastructure and suppliers

  • Application and APIs. Pick a written standard such as the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard and test against it. Rate-limit login, withdrawal and API endpoints, put a WAF and DDoS protection in front of the web and API, and sign webhooks with a timestamp so they cannot be replayed.
  • Infrastructure. Chain bridges and signers reachable only from the platform’s private network; a separate environment per product; encryption in transit and at rest; encrypted nightly backups off-site. A backup that has never been restored is a hope: run a timed restore onto separate hardware and keep the record. DORA asks EU firms to restore onto systems separated from the source (Article 12).
  • Suppliers. Keep a register of every ICT supplier: hosting, KYC, blockchain analytics, RPC or node providers, the wallet or signing provider and the exchange software vendor. The DMM case started at a supplier. Ask each supplier how its staff reach your systems, how releases are built and approved, and what audit rights you have; DORA requires an ICT third-party register and contract terms for EU CASPs (Articles 28 and 30). Production releases should be built from version control, tested, approved by you and reversible.

8. Monitoring and reconciliation

Security monitoring on an exchange is partly a finance job. Reconcile the ledger against on-chain balances continuously, not only the ledger against itself, and treat a check that cannot complete as unknown, never as fine. Alert on the events that precede losses: policy changes, new approvers, approvals outside working hours, hot-wallet balance falling faster than withdrawals explain, and signers or nodes restarting during a withdrawal. Keep an audit log of every sign-in and operator action that the operators themselves cannot edit, and make sure auditors can export it without a vendor engineer. Exchange alerts that cry wolf covers how to keep that alerting usable.

9. Testing

Book an independent penetration test at least once a year and after major changes, scoped to the admin console, custody, withdrawal flows and public APIs, not only the website. Track every finding to closure with a date. Two examples of how regulators write this down:

  • EU. DORA requires a testing programme with appropriate tests at least yearly on all ICT systems supporting critical or important functions, carried out by independent parties (Article 24(4) and (6)); our MiCA CASP application guide maps those rules to evidence.
  • Georgia. NBG Order 207/04 asks registered providers for yearly penetration tests of critical and connected systems and vulnerability scans at least twice a year, and the NBG may cancel a registration over critical findings; see our Georgia guide.

This is a technical reading of the rules, not legal advice; counsel should confirm what applies to your licence.

10. Incident response

Write the plan before you need it, and drill it:

  1. A withdrawal pause that one on-call person can trigger and that needs two people to lift.
  2. A key-compromise procedure per wallet tier: who decides, how funds move to new keys, how customers are told. CCSS 2.04 asks for this in writing.
  3. A reporting clock. Under DORA’s incident rules, as specified in Delegated Regulation 2025/301, a major incident needs an initial notification within four hours of classification and no later than 24 hours after you become aware of it. Record the time of detection and of classification, or you cannot show you met it.
  4. Evidence preservation. Logs and disk images kept before anyone rebuilds a server.
  5. A drill at least yearly, with a record of what took longer than planned.

How to use this checklist with a vendor

Ask each exchange software vendor for evidence per area, not answers: the key-ceremony procedure, a redacted pen-test summary, the policy engine’s change log, the role matrix, a restore-drill record and a list of the logs and exports their system produces for your file. A vendor that cannot show the approval and audit screens running on a live system is asking you to take the most important areas on trust. Our RFP checklist puts these requests in a scoring table.

Be clear about what software cannot do. It can enforce a quorum, delay new addresses, keep keys apart from applications, reconcile and log. It cannot choose honest approvers, run your on-call rota, commission your pen test or file your incident report. Those are yours on every deployment model.

Crypto exchange security checklist FAQ

What security features must a crypto exchange have?

At minimum: hot, warm and cold wallet tiers with a small hot wallet; M-of-N approval for larger withdrawals with address whitelists, delays and daily caps; MFA for every staff and customer account; continuous reconciliation of the ledger against the chain; a tamper-evident audit log; yearly penetration tests; and a written, drilled incident plan with a withdrawal pause.

Is a multisig or MPC wallet enough to secure an exchange?

No. Both raise the number of keys or shares an attacker needs, but in the Bybit and DMM cases attackers got real approvers to sign a manipulated transaction. Approvers need to see what they sign, policy changes need more than one person, and suppliers in the signing path need the same scrutiny as your own systems.

How often should a crypto exchange do a penetration test?

At least once a year and after major changes, covering the admin console, custody, withdrawal flows and APIs. That matches DORA’s yearly testing rule for EU CASPs and the NBG’s yearly pen-test rule in Georgia, which also asks for vulnerability scans at least twice a year.

What is CCSS?

The CryptoCurrency Security Standard, published by the CryptoCurrency Certification Consortium. Version 9.0 has ten aspects in two groups: cryptographic asset management (key generation, wallet generation, storage, access, usage, data sanitization) and operations (security tests, logging and monitoring, governance and risk, key compromise documentation), each at three levels.

Does buying exchange software make my exchange secure?

It gives you controls: approval policies, key separation, reconciliation, logs. Security also depends on your people, your infrastructure and your procedures. Ask any vendor which controls the software enforces, which ones it only records, and which ones remain your team’s job.

BitPolaris licenses exchange and custody software with M-of-N approvals, delays on new addresses, keys apart from the applications, ledger-versus-chain reconciliation and an exportable audit log. Exchange runs on our hosted cloud or your servers; Custody is self-hosted only. Prices are public.

See the Exchange block · Security · Pricing

Sources

  1. FBI, North Korea responsible for $1.5 billion Bybit hack, 26 February 2025, read 13 November 2026
  2. NCC Group, In-depth technical analysis of the Bybit hack, 10 March 2025, read 13 November 2026
  3. FBI, DC3 and NPA, identification of North Korean cyber actors tracked as TraderTraitor responsible for theft of $308 million from DMM Bitcoin, 23 December 2024; SecurityWeek, FBI blames North Korea for $308M cryptocurrency hack, read 13 November 2026
  4. CryptoCurrency Certification Consortium, CCSS v9.0 table, read 13 November 2026
  5. Cloud Security Alliance, Crypto-Asset Exchange Security Guidelines, read 13 November 2026
  6. CISA, Implementing phishing-resistant MFA, October 2022, read 13 November 2026
  7. OWASP, Application Security Verification Standard, read 13 November 2026
  8. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 9, 12, 17–19, 24–25, 28 and 30; Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5, as summarised in our MiCA CASP application guide
  9. National Bank of Georgia, Order No. 207/04, as summarised with primary links in our Georgia VASP registration guide
  10. BitPolaris, Security and Custody pages, read 13 November 2026

Bybit, DMM Bitcoin and Ginco are named from public statements by the agencies and researchers cited; no affiliation is implied.

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